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ABSTRACT 
Given a general knowledge base about a population of individuals, we consider 
the problem of applying, or updating, that general knowledge to reason about a 
particular individual from the population about whom we have only some partial 
and uncertain information. We show that given an inference process for reasoning 
about the general knowledge, this process yields a natural and justifiable method 
of updating to knowledge about a particular individual. In particular, we show 
that in the case of the maximum entropy inference process this yields minimum 
cross entropy updating. We also consider several other updating procedures arising 
in this way. 
KEYWORDS: updating, conditioning, minimum cross entropy, inference, 
inductive reasoning 
INTRODUCTION 
In [1] we introduced an updating procedure appropriate to the sort 
of information arising in the context of expert systems. We now consider 
this procedure in more detail, showing that in the case of the maximum en- 
tropy inference process (ME) it is identical to the method of minimum cross 
entropy. This, together with the justification of ME presented in [2], provides a
natural justification of minimum cross entropy updating that is devoid of 
considerations of the measure of information content. Finally we consider this 
method of updating in the context of other inference processes and give 
examples where it is non-Bayesian. 
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CONTEXT 
We now briefly recall the context of [1]. We assume that we have obtained 
from an expert some statements concerning eneral relationships between 
certain properties (or subsets) of individuals from some population M. For 
example, in [1] M was a set of medical slides of biopsies, and the properties 
were, for example, "shows presence of follicular patterns (F ) , "  "slide 
contains mostly large cells (LC)," "slide shows some linear cell arrangements 
(LCA)," "slide material is from a lymphoma (L) . "  The expert had given 
some general relationships between these properties. For example, 
Follicular pattern strongly suggests a lymphoma 
Large cells are a good indicator of lymphoma 
Follicular pattern is often accompanied by large cells 




Following the approach in [1] these statements could (in consultation with 
the expert) be roughly interpreted as 
ILl =0 .5x  IMI (d') 
IFI =0.1 × IMI (e') 
I FnZ l  =0.9x  IFI (a') 
[ LCA L I = 0.75 × I LCI (b') 
ILCAFI =0.75× IF I (c') 
where L is now identified with the subset of slides from a set M of slides 
that are from lymphomas, etc., and expressions like "strongly suggests" and 
"rather uncommon" are interpreted as numerical statements about proportions. 
Alternatively, following our approach in [3], these could be expressed as 
w( L) = 0.5 (d") 
w(F) = 0.1 (e") 
w(FAL) = 0 .9w(F)  or equivalently w(LIF ) = 0.9 (a") 
w(LCAL)  = 0.75w(LC) or equivalently w(L ILC ) = 0.75 (b") 
w(LC ^F)  = 0 .75w(F)  or equivalently w(LCI F) = 0.75 (c") 
About 50% of slides from this population are from lymphomas (d) 
Follicular patterning is rather uncommon (e) 
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where, for example, w(F)  is interpreted as the expert's belief that a random, 
or as yet unseen, slide will show follicular pattern and w(LI F) the expert's 
belief that a random slide will be from a lymphoma given only the information 
that it shows a follicular pattern. Here belief is measured on the scale [0, 1], 1 
corresponding to certainty, 0 to certainty in the negation, and 1/2 to indiffer- 
ence, and we are assuming that w satisfies the axioms of probability. More 
precisely, fix a language containing the finitely many propositional variables 
F,  LC, L, etc, let SL be the set of sentences for this language, and assume that 
w: SL --' [0, 1] satisfies, for all 0, ,p E SL, 
(i) I f  I-- (0 ~ ~0) then w(O) = w(~o). 
(ii) I f  t--0 then w(O) = 1 and w(-~O) = O. 
(iii) I f  I-- -"(0 A ~o) then w(O V ~o) = w(O) + w(~o). 
Under this rather strong assumption, the first approach is a special case of 
the second, although of course it may lead to different insights and justifica- 
tions. For notational convenience we use the latter in this paper. 
The net effect, then, of our (general) knowledge licitation from the expert is 
that we have acquired a finite set of C linear constraints on w, 
n 
Y~ ajiw(Oj) = b i, i=  1 . . . . .  m 
i= l  
where the aji, b i are real and the Oj E SL. 
Now if we make the assumption that the expert holds his knowledge in this 
form and that the expert has told us everything that is relevant, then C 
represents the sum of the expert's general knowledge in this domain, and hence 
for any 0 e SL, w(O) should be derivable from C and 0. That is, we can 
picture the expert as an inference process N,  which, given (consistent) C and 
0, gives a value N(C)(O) to w(O). I f  we assume further, as is quite reasonable 
in this context, that these values N(C)(O) for w(O) are all consistent with each 
other and with w satisfying C and (i)-(iii), then effectively the inference 
process N is picking a belief (or probability) function w = N(C)  satisfying C 
and (i)-(iii). 
We remark here that we can view this in another, rather simpler, 
way. For let Pk, 1 ___ k ___ j ,  be all the propositional variables in our language, 
and let ot i, 1 _ i _ J ,  run through the atoms in SL, that is, all sentences of the 
form A~= i(-+Pk) • By the disjunctive normal form theorem, any 0 E SL is 
logically equivalent to a disjunction of some of the or/, say ~ (0 ~ vq= 1 arj), 
SO if W satisfies (i)-(iii) then w(O) q J = •i=l  W(Olr i) and ~.i=t w(~i)  = 
1. Hence w is determined by the nonnegative vector w(oq) . . . . .  w(~j ) ,  
which sums to 1 Conversely, any x; > 0 with E ~ • _ /= ~ x /= 1 determine a belief 
function w that satisfies (i)-(iii) simply by setting w(O) q ~ i= I Xr  i" 
Thus picking w to satisfy (i)-(iii) is equivalent to picking x i >_ 0 with 
EiJ__ = . i xi 1 Furthermore, using the above, for w satisfying (i)-(iii), C is 
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equivalent to the vector w(ot) = (w(otl) . . . . .  w(otj)) satisfying a system of 
linear equations 
xK=b.  
Conversely, x satisfying 
xK= b, ~x~= 1, x~_>0 
gives w satisfying C and (i)-(iii). Thus, choosing w satisfying C and (i)-(iii) 
is equivalent to choosing x from 
V(C) = {(x  I . . . . .  x j> lxAc  = a C, x,~O} 
where xA c = a c is xK = b supplemented with the identity ~x  i = 1. In what 
follows we shall use whichever form is most convenient at the time and mix 
them freely, for example, writing w ~ V(C).  
Strictly speaking we should here be talking about inference processes for a 
particular language. However, for notational simplicity we shall avoid explicit 
mention of the dependence on the overlying language, trusting that this will be 
clear from the context. (We shall return to this point later when considering 
language invariance.) 
Returning to the main discussion, for C consistent [i.e., V(C)  :/: Q],  
it would in practice be rather exceptional for V(C)  to be a singleton, so 
that if we are to develop an expert system to mimic the expert (in the weak 
sense) we need some justification for picking a particular point from 
V(C)  or, more generally, a justification for picking a particular inference 
process N. 
In [1] a justification is given in terms of the first formalization above for 
choosing the maximum entropy inference process (ME), where ME(C) is 
s defined to be that point in V(C)  at which the function -E /= ~ x i log(xi) 
is maximal. [Take x log(x) = 0 when x = 0.] In [2] a second justification for 
this same choice is given but from a completely different point of view 
involving "commonsense principles." 
Let us now suppose that we have made our choice of inference process N. 
This would, in theory, enable us to give values to w(O) for all 0 ~ SL based on 
general knowledge C. However, this only amounts to generating eneral 
knowledge that is of rather limited practical value. What we would really 
prefer here is to be able to mimic the expert's diagnosing of actual slides. 
To take an example, suppose the expert was presented with a slide a giving 
(to the expert) only the information that it certainly exhibited follicular pattern, 
that is, w'(F)  = 1, where w'(O) for 0 ~ SL is the expert's belief that tr 
possesses property O. [We assume again that w' satisfies (i)-(iii).] In this case, 
then, on the basis of general knowledge C, a mechanical response might be to 
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give belief 
w'(L) = w(L IF)  --- w(FAL) /w(F )  
to a being from a lymphoma where w = N(C). In particular, then, if (a #) was 
in C we would set w'(L) = 0.9. 
Imagine a similar situation except hat now the only information about a, 
according to the expert, is that his belief that a exhibits a follicular pattern is 
0.55. On the basis of C, what value should be assigned to w'(L)? In this case, 
the generalization, Jeffrey's rule [4] saying that the updated belief w'(O) given 
only w'(~p) should be 
+ w(0 ,) 
can be applied. In particular, if (a"), (d'), and (e") are in C, then on the basis 
of C and w'(F) = 0.55 we would obtain w'(L) = 0.7. This updating has been 
justified by van Fraassen [5]. 
However, these examples are rather special in that the expert would nor- 
maUy give beliefs about o having many properties, and without some deeper 
analysis it is not clear how w should be updated to w'. (Repeated use of 
Jeffrey's rule seems unacceptable, not least because the final answer depends, 
in general, on the order in which the updating is carried out.) 
An underlying difficulty here, or so it seems to us, is that of relating the 
quality of belief measured by w' and that measured by w. In [1] we suggested 
that these could be interpreted in a comparable fashion by introducing a new 
property (propositional variable) S, the property of "being similar to o"  and 
interpreting, for example, 
w ' ( r )  = 0.55 
as the "belief that a random slide satisfying S will (be judged) to have a 
follicular pattern is 0.55." That is, in terms of w, now extended to this larger 
language, 
w(F I S) = 0.55 or equivalently w(SAF)  = 0.55w(S) 
In this way the new, special beliefs about a acquire the same status as the 
general knowledge statements. In summary, then, if the expert now asserts 
constraints C' about w', then we should add to C constraints D, which are just 
C' with each w'(O) replaced everywhere by w(S A O)/w(S). In this context, 
then, having settled for an inference process N, it seems natural to take the 
updated belief that a has property 0, that is, w'(O), to be 
N(C + O)(S^O) 
N(C + D)(S) 
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However, as discussed in [1], C + D omits an item of information about S 
that can be significant, namely, that we should include some statement of the 
belief that a random slide will have property S. In general, of course, being 
similar to S will be extremely rare; indeed, we would expect it to be 
potentially infinitesimal, depending on how hard we look at a, and we would 
propose adding the additional belief w(S) = e and letting e tend to zero. That 
is, following [1] we propose the following method of updating based on an 
inference process N: 
Given C, C' as above, set 
C" =C+D+w(S)  =e,  e>O 
and update w on the constraints C' by 
N(C")(SAO) 
w'(O) = lim 
E--,o N(C")(S) 
(We are assuming here that C" is consistent, a point we shall consider in the 
next section.) 
PROPERTIES OF THE UPDATING PROCEDURE 




or equivalently, since N(C")(S) = e, the limit 
1 
I im-N(C" ) (S^O)  
e~O 
exists for all 0. We shall show that it does exist for N = ME (a fact that was 
omitted from [1]), for N = CM, the center-of-mass inference process, and for 
N = MD, the minimum-distance inference process. However, it is possible to 
concoct "pathological" inference processes in which such limits do not exist. 
Assuming for the moment hat w' is well defined, notice that w' does still 
satisfy C'  and (i)-(iii). 
Before proceeding to cases of specific N, we first consider the question of 
the consistency of C" for sufficiently small e. 
THEOREM 1 Suppose C, C' are separately consistent and for no 0 ~ SL 
is it the case that w(O) = 0 for all w e V(C) and w'(O) ¢ 0 for all 
w' e V(C~). Then C" is consistent for all sufficiently small e > O. 
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The proof of this result, and of those that follow, can be found in the appendix. 
The first two requirements for this theorem, consistency of C, C', are only 
what one would in practice expect to hold given that the belief satisfies 
(i)-(iii). The third requirement amounts to saying that if the general knowledge 
entails that the belief in a random sample (i.e., slide) satisfying 0 is zero, then 
no sample should satisfy 0. This again seems, in practice, a reasonable 
property if, as here, 0 is a finite Boolean combination of (presumably) rather 
simple properties corresponding to propositional variables. 
Notice that, conversely, if C" is consistent for some e > 0, then all three 
requirements of the theorem hold. For this reason we shall refer to this 
situation simply as C"-consistent. 
For the case of N = ME, which was discussed extensively in [1], we have 
the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2 For C, C', C", etc., as above, C" consistent, and N = ME, 
w'(O) exists and equals the minimum cross entropy update of N(C) 
conditioned on the set of constraints C'. 
Here the minimum cross entropy update on C' of a probability function w o is 
defined to be that (unique) x ~ V(C~ for which 
i~=xilog( xi Wo( i) 
is minimal and can be justified (see Williams [61) as the solution w' to C' 
whose Shannon information measure relative to w o is minimal. 
The relevance of Theorem 2 is that, in conjunction with our main result in 
[21, it provides a simple, commonsense justification for minimum cross 
entropy updating without he need to invoke relative measures of information 
content. 
Notice that by Williams' results in [6] this updating generalizes Bayesian 
conditioning and Jeffrey's rule. Our next example shows that this need not 
always be the case. 
The center-of-mass inference process, CM, is defined so that CM(C) is the 
center of mass of V(C), assuming uniform density. Precisely, 
/vtc)X~ dV 
CM(C)(o~i) - /vtc)d V 
where the integrals are taken in the relative dimension, with the same basis. 
Let G be the set of constraints {w'(oti) = 0 1 i~I},  where I=  {i I vxe  
v(c ) ,  xi = o}. 
THEOREM 3 For C, C', etc., as above, C" consistent, and N = CM, 
w'(O) exists and equals CM(C" + G)(O). 
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This updating is interesting in that, with the exception of what the general 
knowledge implies is impossible, it throws away the general knowledge 
entirely. 
A result similar to that of Theorem 2 also holds for the minimum-distance 
inference process, MD. Here 
MD(C) = that xe  V(C) for which ~ x 2 [equivalently ~ (x  i - -  1/ j )2]  
is minimal 
THEOREM 4 For C, C', etc., as above, C" consistent, and N = MD, 
w'(O) exists. In particular, i f  MD(C)(oti) > 0 for 1 <_ i <_ J and 
~xiMD(C)(t~ i) has a unique maximum point in V(C3, then w' is this 
point. 
As an example of what this can mean, suppose that the assumptions of 
Theorem 4 hold and C' consists imply of w'(0) = l, that is, tr certainly has 
0. Suppose (o )  
I-- 0~ V o~j~ 
i= l  
and MD(C)(~j,) is the strictly largest among {MD(C)(o~ji) I 1 __ i _< q}. 
Then in this case the updating will give w'(aj,) = 1, concentrating all belief 
in this single atom. Again there is no reason for this to agree with Bayesian 
conditioning. 
We finally remark that for this process to provide a reasonable method of 
updating there are certain properties that are desirable in N. One is that for 
consistent C, if N(C)(e~i) = 0 then it should be the case that x i = 0 for all 
x ~ V(C). For if N fails to satisfy this we run the risk of being asked to update 
on an event hat we have already dismissed as impossible, that is, given belief 
0. The processes ME and CM satisfy this, but MD does not. 
A second esirable property is that the enlargement of C to C" should have 
a revising effect on the old knowledge, which disappears with e, that is, 
l imN(C")(O) = N(C)(O) for 0 eSL  
~-"~0 
Without this it seems hard to give any authority or status to the general 
knowledge at all. Fortunately, this is satisfied by all the processes we have 
considered. 
A third property of N that is desirable as regards this updating is language 
independence; that is, N(C)(O) should not change if we enlarge the languages 
by adding new propositional variables that do not appear in C or 0. This is 
required to justify the initial exclusion from the language of S (and the 
multitude of other similar properties) because, presumably, S existed even 
before we had any information about it. 
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Unfortunately, although both ME and MD satisfy language independence, 
CM does not. This can be "rectified" if we define CM~*(C)(0) to be the limit 
of the CM(C)(0) as the number of propositional variables in the overlaying 
language tends to infinity. This inference process is language-independent and, 
as can be seen by taking limits, Theorem 3 holds with CM ~° in place of CM. 
Alternatively, this can be proved by a proof similar to that of Theorem 2 using 
the characterization (i  L). 
THEOREM 5 For C, etc., as above, 
CM~*(C) = that point in V(C)  at which ~ log(xi) is maximal 
i¢i 
where I= {Jl vx•  V(C), xj = 0}. 
The above desirable properties also hold for the maximum transfer probability 
inference process (MTP), which is defined by 
MTP(C) : that x • V(C) for which ~ ~ is maximal 
and a proof similar to that of Theorem 2 yields Theorem 3 again for MTP. 
In this case, this answer is perhaps a little disappointing, as the origins of 
this process in particle physics yield a well-established updating, which in the 
case of C, C', etc., as above would give the x•  V(C ~) for which 
Z[x  i MTP(C)(cti) f/2 is maximal (see Domotor [7].) 
Concerning desirable properties of the updating process itself, for each of 
N = ME, MD, CM ~*, if C = O,  the updating process on C' gives w' = 
N(C3, which agrees with the commonsense feeling that updating zero informa- 
tion should be the same as starting anew. However, this is not a general 
property of reasonable inference processes, as can be seen by considering the 
inference process that selects that x • V(C) minimizing 
E [log(x,)] 2 
i¢l 
where I = { j l  Vx•  V(C), xj = 0}. 
A second property of the updating process based on N that might be 
considered esirable is that if V(C) c_ V(C'), that is, the updating information 
gives us no reason to revise beliefs, then updating should have no effect; that 
is, we should have w" = N(C). This indeed holds for N = ME but fails in 
general for N = MD, CM ~* even in the case C' = ~o. In the particular case 
that C = C'--that is, the constraints on w' are exactly the same as those on 
w--w'  does indeed equal N(C) for N = MD, CM ~*. However, even this is 
not guaranteed of such updatings in general, the above example of the 
minimum point of ~iCt [log(xi)] 2 again providing a counterexample. 
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AN EXAMPLE 
As a simple example, consider the case where the general knowledge 
consists of 
w(p)  : a, w(q l  p) : ~, w(q)  = 3, 
where p,  q are propositional variables and ct~ < 3, < 1 - a + ct/3 (thus 
ensuring consistency and I = O).  
To simplify matters, further suppose that /~ > !/2,  so p is a positive 
indicator of q, and that 0 < or, 3' < 1/2, so that both p and q are rather 
uncommon although not impossible. 
Now suppose that we learn that the expert's belief in tr exhibiting p is 6, 
that is, 
w ' (p )  = t5 
Then updating on the bases of ME, MD, CM ~* gives, respectively, values for 
w'( q) of 
(~-  ~) (a -  ~) 
7 + , a, 1/2 
1 -or  
As remarked earlier, then, CM ~ ignores the general knowledge altogether 
and hence finds no connection between p and q. MD acts somewhat less 
extremely, but still in a cavalier fashion, ignoring the general knowledge 
constraints on w(p),  w(q) (essentially because ol, -y are small) while elevating 
the constraint w(q [ P) = 3 to the status of an equivalence between p and q 
(essentially because 3 is large). Finally, ME gives a rather more balanced 
answer, which is seen to tend to ~ as a and 7 tend to zero. 
APPENDIX 
THEOREM 1 Suppose C, C" are separately consistent and for  no 0 e SL 
is it the case that w(O) = 0 for  all w e V(C) and w'(O) #: 0 for  all 
w' e V(C3. Then C ~ is consistent for  all sufficiently small e > O. 
Proof Let I=  {i1 vweV(C) ,  w(~i )= 0}, and for each i 6 I  pick 
wie V(C) with wi(cti) > 0. Then for all we  V(C), w(Vie1 a i )  = 0, SO for 
some Ue V(C3, u(Vi~i c~i) = 0 and hence u(ai) = 0 for all i e I .  
Let 
I 1, ,,,,, I I  
eo=min  ~ Wi(Olr) r~ I  >0 
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Then it is easy to see that for 0 < e <_ t o, w e defined by 
we(OlrA S ) = eu(Otr )  
1 
we( Olr/~ aS  ) ~- Z wi( Olr) - eU(Olr) 
J -  Ill ¢ I  
is in V(CO). 
THEOREM 2 For C, C', C", etc., as above, C ~ consistent, and N = ME, 
w'(O) exists and equals the minimum cross entropy update of  IV(C) 
conditioned on the set o f  constraints C'. 
Proof Using the notation introduced earlier, let 
V(C)  = {(x  I . . . . .  x+) lxAc=a c, x i>0 } 
V(C')  = { (y l  . . . . .  YJ) IYAc" = ac,, Yi >- 0} 
Then V(CO) is the set of  (x I . . . . .  x j ,  Yt . . . . .  y j) for which 
(x+y)Ac=ac ,  YAc, =eac , ,  xi, Yi>-O (*) 
where the x i correspond to the atoms o~ i ^  -~S and the Yi to the atoms o~ i A S. 
Let 3' = ME(C),  p(e), 5(e) = ME(C°), and 3"(e) = p(e) + ~(e). 
Clearly, since ~6i(e)  = e, l im~ o 8(e) = 0. Also, l im~ o 3"(e) = 3". To see 
this, first notice that if 3 , j=0  then (see [1]) j e I=  { i lVxeV(C) ,  
x i = 0} so 3, j (e)= 0, since 3"(e)~ V(C), and hence ~ j (e )= 0. Thus, 
for e sufficiently small, 3' - 5(e), ~(e) e V(CO), so 
e(3" - ~(~)) + e (~(~) )  _ e ( , (~) )  + e (8(~) )  
where E(x)  = - ~i]=l x i log(x/). 
Hence, since 3'(e)~ V(C), 
0_< e(3" ) -  e(3"(~))  
= [e(3 ' )  - e(3'  - ~(~))1 
+[  e(3" - ~(~)) - ~( , (~) ) ]  
+ [e ( , (~) )  - e(3"(~))]  
<_ [6(3 ' )  - e(3" - 8(~))]  
+ [e (~(~) )  - e (~(~) ) ]  
Hence by uniform continuity of E, 
l imE(3"(e))  = E(3' )  
e-~,O 
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Furthermore, since any duster point (as e ~ 0) of the 7(e)  must be in the 
closed set V(C) ,  the convexity of E forces l im~ 0 7(e)  = 3, as required. 
Now consider adding the equation 
to (*). Since this equation is satisfied by v(e), ~(t),  the new system of 
equations, which is equivalent o 
x = 7(e)  - y ,  YAc ,  = eac ' ,  x i ,  Yi >- 0 
has the same maximum entropy solution, namely, x = v(e), y = ~(e). Thus, 
y = ~(e) is the solution of 
yA c, =eac , ,  0 < Yi <- "~i(e) 
which maximizes 
J 
- ~ ,  {Y i l °g (Y i )  + [~/ (~)  - Y i ] l °g[T i (e )  - Yi]}" 
i= l  
As remarked above, if some 7i = 0, then it must be the case that 7i(e) = 0. 
Thus in the above expression we may drop any summands for which 7i = 0. 
Assuming, for notational convenience, that there are none, we may assume 
e < 7k(e) for 1 _< k _< J ,  and hence the condition Yi <- "yi(e) in the above can 
be dropped because 7A c, = ea c, contains the equation Y~Yi = e. 
Now put z = y /e  so that ~(e) /e  is the solution of 
zAc ,  = ac ' ,  zi >- 0 
which maximizes 
J 
H(e , 'y (e ) , z )  = - ~ {ez i log(ez i )  + [T i (e ) -  ezi] log['Yi(e) - ez i ]}  
i= i  
Applying Taylor's theorem and the (given) identities F.zi = ~'Yi (e)  = 1, we 
obtain 
H(e ,  ~?(e), z) = -e log(e)  - ~ 7 i (e ) log[T i (e ) ]  - e 
- e [Y~ z i log(z i )  - z/ log 7i(e)]  
~2 Z 2 
_~) - -~ 
2 "~i(~) -- l"l~Z i
for some 0 < ~/ < 1. 
Now let r be the solution of 
7.A c" = ac" , Zi >- 0 
Updating that Justifies Minimum Cross Entropy 13 
that minimizes 
K(Z , 'y )  = ~--~ zilog 
i=1  \ "Yi 
that is, r is the minimum cross entropy update of "y = ME(C) on the set of 
constraints C'. To prove the result we must show 
lim ~ = r (**) 
e- '0  E 
Since then for O e SL, say ~ (O ,-* vq= i ctj,), 
ME(C')(S^O) 
w'(O) = lim 
E-.o ME(C") (S) 
1 q 
= l im-- E ME(C") (a j  AS) 
e--~O C i=  I 
1 q q 
= l im- -~S j ; (e )  = ~r j ,  
e-~0 E i=1 i=1 
and this last value is precisely the value given to 0 by the probability 
function r. 
So it only remains to show (**). But by maximality of ~(e)/e, 
0 _< n(e ,  , (e ) ,  ~(e) /e )  - H(e ,  ~(e) ,  , )  
<__ -~[ t r (~(~) /~, ,1 , (~) )  - t : ( , - ,  ~ , (~) ) ]  + d~ ~ 
for some constant d because we have dropped those coordinates i for which 
%= 0. 
Now if the 5(e) /e had a cluster point X :# r as e ---' 0, then by choice of r, 
K(X, ~,) - K(, ' ,  7) > c > 0 for some constant c, so for arbitrarily small e, 
- K ( , ,  + de  2 _< -ec  + de  2 < 0 
which is a contradiction. Hence 5(e) /e - ,  T as required. 
THEOREM 3 For C, C', etc., as above, C" consistent, and N = CM, 
w'(0) exists and equals CM(C' + G)(O), where G is the set of constraints 
{w' ( ,~ , )  = O I i~t  } andI = {J l  vxe  V(C),  xj = 01. 
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Proof For N = CM the updating process gives 
1 
Wt( Oti) ~- lim -CM( C")( txi A S) 
e-~O e
f v(c.)y i dV 
= lim 
~--~o e f v dV  
(c") 





fv Zt dV  
z = y /e ,  this 
V~={<x,~>l(x+e~)Ac=ac, rAc ,="c , ,  x , , z ,~0/  
Notice that A o is a J x J matrix with all entries 0 except those eli with 
i~L  Similarly, define A G, to be a J x J matrix with all entries 0 except 
those eii with i~ I ' ,  where I '  = {i1 vz  ~ 0, zA c, = a c, & zA G = 0 
zi = 0}. Notice that I c_  F ,  so rAG'  = 0 implies z.A G = 0. Lot 
V o= {(x ,z )  l xA  c=a o zA c, =ac , ,  rAG=O,  x i, z i>-O}. Then V~ 
- ,  V o as e ~ 0 in the Blaschke topology. Pick u ___ 0 such that uA c = ac 
and u i = 0 only if i~L  Similarly, pick v ~ 0 such that vA c, = ac, ,  and 
u i = 0 only if i e I ' .  Lot t I . . . . .  t ,  be a basis for 
{x I xAc = xAG = 0} 
and let s I . . . . .  Sq be a basis for 
{zlrAc, = rAG, = 0} 
Then for sufficiently small e > 0, (u - ev, u) ~ V~ and (t I, 0/ . . . . .  
(t  k, 0}, ( - es l, sl) . . . . .  ( - eSq, Sq) is a basis for 
{ ( x, ~)I(~ + ~)  Ac = xAG = rA~, =rAc" -- 0} 
Noticing that (x ,  z)  - (u - ev, u I is in this set for any (x, z) ~ V~ for e > 
0, we see that, for sufficiently small e > 0, V~ and V o have the same rel- 
ative dimensions, and hence by standard results in convexity (see, e.g.,  
Eggleston [8]), 
lim f d r= fvodr . O, etc. 
~ OSv~ 
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Hence, 
f z idV JvoZ idV Jv  z~dV 
E (c'+ G) 
lira -- = 
fvdV fvodV fv dV 
(C'+G) 
as required, since 
= CM(C'  + G)(c~,) 
dV, etc. 
THEOREM 4 For C, C', etc., as above, C" cons&tent, and N = MD, 
w'(O) exists. In particular, if MD(C)(ai) > 0 for 1 <_ i <_ J and 
ZxiMD(C)(~ i) has a unique maximum point in V(C3, then w' is this 
point. 
Proof We adopt the notation of the proof of Theorem 2 but with p(e), 
~(e) = MD(C"). Notice that this point depends continuously on e because the 
convex set V(C") depends continuously on e in the Blaschke topology. Hence, 
to prove the first part of the theorem it is sufficient o show that there are only 
finitely many possible values that lim,~oo [6(e, ) /e , ]  can take for e n ~ 0. 
To this end, pick a sequence , ~ 0 for which this limit exists. By taking a 
subsequence if necessary we may assume that there are fixed T x, T yC_ 
{ l, 2 . . . . .  J} such that for all n, 
r x : {i I~,(E.)  : 0},  TY = { i ] t~ i (en)  = 0} 
We shall show that the above limit depends only on T ~, T y, thus giving the 
required result. 
Clearly, for e in this sequence, 
MD(C") = that point in V(C") for which 
x, = 0 for ie  T x, 
Yi  = 0for  i t  T y, 
J 
and ~ ( x 2 + y/2) is minimal 
i= l  
Ignoring the variables that are set to zero, we see that 
MD(C") = that (v, z) which satisfies 
(v,  z)B = b(c ) ,  v,  z -> 0 
for which Y~ v 2 + Y~ z/z is minimal 
where the v i are those xy~ with Ji e '  T'~, the zi are those Yk, with k i e '  T y, B 
is a suitable matrix obtained from Ac,, A c (and not involving e), and b(e) is 
linear in t. The importance of reexpressing MD(C") in this way is that, 
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because the ~,ji(e), ~j,(e) > 0, the constraint v, z -> 0 can be dropped here, 
and the convexity of ~:v/2 + ~z/2 ensures that this (unique) vector is the one 
given by applying the method of Lagrange multipliers with the constraint 
(v, z/B = b(e) 
Applying that method in this case to minimize ~:v/2 + ~z~ gives 
2(v, z) = hE  
where ~, are the Lagrange multipliers and E is a suitable matrix that, 
importantly, does not depend on e. Multiplying on the right here by B gives 
2b(e)  = XeB 
From this we see that we can find 1~ linear in e and hence obtain the z 
[i.e., the ~k~(e)] as linear functions of e. It must follow that CSk,(e) = dke  for 
some (fixed) dk, > 0, and the result follows. 
The last part follows as in the proof of Theorem 2 by considering, in this 
case, 
J 
z )  : Z - 2 +  2z, 
i=l 
J J 
= ~ ")/i(g) 2 -- 2~- '~ Zi'y,(C ) + 2C2~ Z 2 
i=1 i=1 
and arguing in a similar fashion but now with r the (assumed unique) solution 
of zA c, = aC', zi >- 0 maximizing ~iJ__ 1 "YiZi • 
THEOREM 5 For C, etc., as above, 
CM~( C) = that point in V( C) at which 
log(xi) is maximal 
i¢i 
where I = { j I vx  • V(C), xj = 0}. 
Proof Since this result is not directly relevant o the main topic of this 
paper, we shall simply sketch the main points of the proof. 
Let CM(C) be defined as before by 
fv(c) x~ dV 
CM(C) (a / )  = I v  dV 
(c) 
where the integrals are taken over the relative dimension, k say, of V(C) ~ ~ J 
and x i corresponds to the atom c~ i of the language L. 
Let CMm(C) be defined similarly, but now with the overlying language 
extended by adding m new propositional variables q~ . . . . .  qm, say. Let 
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g = 2 m, and let x i j ,  1 < j <_ g,  correspond to the new atoms 
Ol i A -I- ql  A "'" A -I- qm 
Without lOSS of generality we may assume that I = { r + 1 . . . . .  J} and 
that in the set 
Ro= {(x i  . . . . .  x j )  l xAc=ac ,  x i=Ofor  r < i < J} 
the x I . . . . .  x k are the independent variables, that is, there are linear func- 
tions f i :  ~k~i~t J  for i=  1 . . . . .  J such that if (x  I . . . . .  x~)eR o then 
(x  I . . . . .  x j )  = ( f , (x  1 . . . . .  x~)  . . . . .  f j (x l  . . . . .  xk )  ), and for any 
x 1 . . . . .  x k this latter vector is in R 0. Then V(C)  has relative dimension k, 
and 
. . . . .  
• . .  X i dXl . . .  dx  k 
'~ a2(x l )  ~ ak(xl  . . . . .  xk - i )  
CM(C)  (o~i) = 
same integral without x i 
for some well-behaved bj, aj,  where x i = f i (x l  . . . . .  xk) .  
Now consider CMm(C).  In this case, 
g m = {(x H . . . . .  Xlg . . . . .  x~l . . . . .  Xjg) l yA  c = a c ,  x i j  = 0 
fo r r< i<_ J ,  l<_ j<_g} 
g 
where Yi = E j= 1 x i j  for 1 _< i _< J and the independent variables may be 
taken as the Xil . . . . .  Xig  for 1 _< i-< k together with any g -  1 of 
Xi l  , . . . , X ig  for k < i _< r. 
In this case, if instead of calculating CMm(C)(ot i )  directly, we first make 
the change of variables 
g g -1  
Xi  = ~ X i j '  Y i l  = ~ X i j  . . . . .  Y i ,  g - '  = X i l  
j= l  j= l  
we obtain, after canceling out the nonzero Jacobian, the value for CM m(C)(oti) ,  
ZilSoXlSo yli " " ""["'"-'i":'X"JOX~'''So":'"-' ' ' ' ioXr'' 'So >'" 'x ia <avo  a:<x,, 
same integral without x i 
where, for k < j __< J ,  x j  = f j (x  t . . . . .  xk) .  
On integrating with respect o the y ' s  and canceling some constants, this 
gives 
i. i"2'x"... I ''<x' ..... . . .  
a I Ja2(x  I) ~ak(x  I . . . . .  xk_  I) 
same integral without x i 
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Now let (e I . . . . .  er) be the (unique) maximum point of I i j :  l Xj for 
x ~ V(C), that is, the maximum point of 
E log(xi) for x e V(C) 
i¢l 
r Clearly, as m tends to infinity, the function (H j= t xj) g- ~ on V(C) becomes 
more and more peaked at (el . . . . .  e j) (where e i = 0 for r < j _< J) ,  and 
from this observation it is straightforward to show that in the limit CMm(C)(oti) 
tends to the value of x i at this point, that is, to e;, as required. 
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